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Abstract 
This paper aims to assess the level of departure of the actual black market 
rate from its real level. Our finding indicate divergence of the actual 
black market rate from the real level, ranging  from 7% in October 2016 
to about  38% in November 2017. This result imply 38% of the foreign 
exchange price in the black market rate in November 2017 was due to 
manipulative trading strategies exerted by a few powerful traders in the 
market. The study concludes that in the very short term to curb increasing 
depreciation of the domestic currency rate in the black market, it is 
essential to control domestic liquidity expansion, and raise the cost (risk) 
of dealing in the black market by imposing higher penalty cost on dealers 
in this market.  
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1- Introduction:  
Growing activities of black market for foreign exchange in some 
developing countries in the past few decades have attracted the attention 
of policy makers' as well as academicions. It become obvious to many 
economist in recent years that effective foreign exchange policy should 
take into account the link between the black market for foreign exchange 
and the rest of the economy, if viable economic planning is to set forth. 
Here in Sudan, Since seperation of oil rich South Sudan from the rest of 
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country in July 2011, and loss of about 75% of  oil revenue , the black 
market rate  premium over the official rate expanded rapidly due 
increasing demand for hard currencies. To control speculative effects on 
foreign exchange tradings, the the Central bank  of Sudan decided to 
tighten control on exchange bureaux by enforcing additional restrictions 
on foreign exchange sales and oftenly cracking down  on black 
marketeers for foreign exchange.  
To understand the operational mechanism of imperfect market it is 
essential to decompose the effect of fundamental factors from the effect 
of nonfundamental speculative strategies on pricing. In competitive 
efficient market asset prices change only in response to change in 
fundamental variables. When a trader purchase foreign currency solely 
for its expected payoff due to future change in fundamentals, the foreign 
exchane is said to be driven mainly by fundamentals. However, if  the 
market is dominated by non-fundamental speculative motives, the 
currency price diverge from its fundamental real value. Thus, systematic 
divergence of the price from its fundamental value is an indication of 
bubble. Blanchard and Watson, 1982, refer to such type of bubbles as 
self-fulfilling expectations that push the currency price towards expected 
price level, which is unrelated to change in the fundamentals of the  price.  
The expanding  gap between black market rate and the official exchange 
rate in the past few years became a major concern for the  authorities in 
Sudan. Some basic questions we would like to answer in this paper 
includes:  Is the black market rate for foreign exchange in Sudan is a free 
exchange rate that reflect change in fundamental macroeconomic 
variables? What are the major factors that nurture the black market 
foreign currencies in recent years? and finally, what is the best predictor 
of the black market rate? 
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To answer the first question we assessed profitability of technical trading 
rules, to see if speculative trading rules can gain significant profit to 
currency dealers.To answer the second and third questions we 
investigated the association between high powered money and change in 
black market prices.  
 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section two 
highlights literature review. Section three illustrates technical trading 
rules and shows how simple trading rules can attract significant gains to 
traders. The final section concludes the study. 
 
2-Literiture review 
Studying volatility in asset markets in general can help controlling asset 
markets irregularities and detecting volatility  boundaries (Bollerslev et 
al., 2003). The increasing sensitivity of major economic indicators in 
underdevolpoed economies to volatility in black market for foreign 
exchange highlights the importance of modeling volatility in these 
markets. The literature on black market for foreign exchange takes two 
approaches: the first approach adapt specification of determinants of 
black market rate premium. A partial list of articles in this tradition 
includes Dornbusch et al. (1983), Fishelson (1988), Culbertson (1989), 
Phylaktis (1992), and Shachmurove (1999). The second approach focuses 
on the impact of black market rate volatility on macroeconomic 
indicators. Musila and Al-Zyoud (2012) following the latter approach 
assess the relationship between black market volatility and volume of 
international trade in sub-Saharan African countries and indicate that 
reducing  volatility in the  black market rate increase (though 
insignificant) international trade flow to these countries. But findings by 
5 
  
Makochekanwa (2007) show the black market rate has significant impact 
on hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, during 1999 -2006. 
Caporale and Cerrato (2008 ) investigate the long-run relationship 
between black market and official exchange rates in a number of Asian 
emerging economies to show weak evidence of long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the two market rates. In study of exchange markets 
in India and Sri Lanka, Emran and Shilipi (2010) show black market rates 
are weak indicators of equilibrium exchange rate.  Jayaratnam (2003)  
investigates the impact of black market premium on FDI to show that 
reduction in black market premium has little impact on FDI flows in a 
number of developing countries.   
 
3: Technical Trading Rules and Trading Signals 
 
In recent years more research results unveiled the predictive power of 
technical trading rules in emerging stock markets. A number of research 
studies (Besseminder and Chan, 1995; Ratner and Leal 1999; Ito 1999;  
Kho 1996; Levich and Thomas,1993),  indicated that trading rules 
showed significant predictive power of profits in a number of Asian  
markets  including Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan, but less predictive in 
more developed markets of Hong Kong and Japan. In a more 
comprehensive study including Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, Canada, and 
U.S., stock markets, Ito (1999) found trading rules captures quite strongly 
trading patterns (buy and sell signals) in all these markets with exception 
of the U.S., stock markets. Similar conclusion supporting relevance of 
trading rules analysis in Latin America stock markets concluded by 
Ratner and Leal (1999). 
Since efficient market hypothesis imply,  prices in efficient markets 
reflect all available information to the extent that excess returns generated 
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from any additional information cannot exceed transaction costs of 
trading on that stock (Fama and Blume 1966), then evidence of profit 
generation in stock or currency market using past price behavior entails 
indication of market inefficiency. Thus, investigation of technical trading 
analysis may have important implications on a market regulations, in 
addition to its benefit to investors with respect to availability of potential 
opportunities.  
In the following we investigate whether technical analysis can be 
exploited to predict significant profit returns in the black market.  
3.1. Simple Technical Rules: 
Technical trading rules assume price change  follow predictable patterns 
that can be exploited for trading strategies. While there are different 
specifications of trading rules, the most simple and more often employed 
by practitioners are the variable length moving average (VMA), and the 
trading-range break. To explain these two rules, let 
).......2,1( Ttsit   be the ith daily stock price index, so that its return can be 
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where ts is the stock price at time t. 
Alternatively, to compute the variable moving average rule, a short-
period moving average (SMA) and a long-period moving average (LMA) 
rules need to be computed, so that n is set equal to the number of trading 
days in a week (i.e., n = 3) for SMA, and n>10, for LMA. In this case a 
buy order can be signaled when itit LMASMA  , by an amount larger than 
pre-specified band level; and a sell order when itit LMASMA   by an 
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amount lower than the band. The trading-range break signals buy order 
when the price rises above its last local maximum (the resistance level), 
and a sell order when the price sink below its last local minimum (the 
support level). 
The t-test statistics for the buys (sells) are defined as: 
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where rrr N,,
2  are the mean return, estimated variance, and the number 
of buy (sell) days;   and  N are the population mean and number of 
observations.  
And the t-test statistics for the buy-sell are defined as: 
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where sbsb NandN,,  are respectively the buy and sell mean returns 
and the number of days for the buys and sells. In the table the term 
(1,20,0.01) refer to the short period is one day, the long period is 20 days, 
and the band is 1%.   
Results in table (1) indicate profitability of variable length moving 
avergae trading rule by currency traders. The findings in the table show 
positive profits can be  gained if traders practice simple trading rule of 
buying at the low price levels and selling at higher prices in periods 
ranging from one day to three weeks . Such practice of buying and selling 
at different prices also supported by figure (1), which indicates the buying 
periods by the upward arrows , and the selling periods by the downward 
arrows. On the other hand, table (2) indicate trading rules in the black 
market for foreign exchange do not support a positive profit gains when 
support and resistence trading strategies are assumed.  
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In tables (3) and (4), we simulated a hypothetical example of three traders 
who are able to cordinate among themself as in the oligopoly models, 
under two senarios. The first senarion in table (3) shows sustainability of 
the cordinated tradings when traders have a fixed amount of domestic 
cuurency balance and trade a fixed amount of foreign currency among 
themselves (US$10). In such case the trading in FX is not sustainable 
even when they have a market power to set price at the levels they want. 
This can be indicated by the declining amount of foreign currency 
balance from US$ 33 in the initial period 1 to US$19 in the final period. 
However, under the second senario it is  assumed that traders have the 
same fixed amount of foreign currency, but they have access to  
increasing domestic currency balance. In this case the trading of FX in 
the black market becomes sustainable, as their total balance in foreign 
exchange increase from US$44 in the initial period to about US$ 100 in 
the final period. These results imply as long as traders in black market for 
foreign exchange have access to increasing domestic currency, via 
smuggling activities or whatever, black market activities may not 
disappear even when foreign currency amounts traded in the black market 
for FX remained fixed.  
Given that growth  in domestic liquidity (money supply) is fundamental 
driver of change in black market rate (figure 2), to assess the size of over-
pricing of the black market rate due to speculative trading of foreign 
exchange in the black market, we estimated the black market rate 
consistent with the growth in money supply (M2), and refer to it as 
realistic rate of the black market rate. As reported in table (5), the excess 
of the actual black market rate over the  estimated rate indicates the size 
of over-pricing due to speculative trading activities in the black market. 
Results in table (5) show increasing divergence between the estimated 
and the actual rates. This imply that the size of over-price in the black 
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market increased from 7% in October  2016  to  38% in November 2017. 
This result shows the  effect of speculative motives, as opposed to 
fundamental drivers, were more dominant in 2017, albeit in the last four 
months of 2017. 
 
 
Table (1):Variable length moving average rule 
 FX 
mean 
Std.dev Min/Max 
[1, 15; 0.01] 
Buy-Sell 
t-stat 
 
-0.86* 
-51.23 
 
7.09 
 
 
-8.0/8.2 
[1, 20; 0.01] 
Buy-Sell 
t-stat 
 
-0.16* 
-57.80 
 
7.14 
 
-7.9/8.2 
[5, 15; 0.01] 
Buy-Sell 
t-stat 
 
-1.44* 
-46.43 
 
6.9 
 
-8.0/8.2 
[5, 20; 0.01] 
Buy-Sell 
t-stat 
 
-0.36* 
-43.40 
 
7.13 
 
-7.9/8.2 
*significant at 1% significance level. 
 
Table (2): Trading Range Break (support & resistance) 
 Fx 
mean 
St.dev Min/Max 
Buy 
t-stat 
7.8* 
31.5 
0.13 7.6/8.2 
Sell 
t-stat 
6.4* 
-18.7 
0.18 6.0/6.7 
Buy-Sell 
t-stat 
1.04* 
-38.1 
7.13 -6.7/8.2 
*significant at 1% significance
 
 
 
 
Fig(1): Buy and sell strategies (2016)
Table (3): Price setting and oligopolistic gains
               (Senario 1: restricted liquidity access)
 
 
 
0.0000
1.0000
2.0000
3.0000
4.0000
5.0000
6.0000
7.0000
8.0000
9.0000
2-Jan 2-Feb 2-Mar 2-Apr
Periods FX Rate  
S£/ US$ 
Trader 1
S£           US
1 20 -- 10 
2 22 220 -- 
3 24 220 -- 
4 30 -80 10 
5 40 320 -- 
6 50 320 -- 
 level. 
 
:  
 
2-May 2-Jun 2-Jul 2-Aug 2-Sep 2-Oct 2-Nov 2-Dec
 
$ 
Trader 2 
S£            US$ 
Trader 3 
S£               US$ 
T o t a l  b a l a n c e
For the 3 traders
in  US
220 -- 240 -- 
-- 10 240 -- 
240 -- -- 10 
240 -- 300 -- 
240 -- -100 10 
-260 10 400 -- 
10 
 
 
 
$ 
33 
30 
29 
25 
21 
19 
11 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (4 ): Price setting and oligopolistic gains:  
                (Senario 2: sufficient liquidity access) 
                    
                       
Periods FX Rate  
S£/ US$ 
Trader 1 
S£          US$ 
Trader 2 
S£          US$ 
Trader 3 
S£                US$ 
T o t a l  b a l a n c e 
For the 3 traders 
in  US$ 
1 20 220 10 220 -- 240 -- 
44 
2 22 600 -- 500 10 500 -- 
82 
3 24 800 -- 800 -- 800 10 
110 
4 30 900 10 900 -- 900 -- 
100 
5 40 1020 -- 1020 -- 1020 10 
86 
6 50 1500 -- 1500 10 1500 -- 
100 
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Fig (2):Prediction of the black market rate 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
                      Table (5): Speculative trading effect 
 Over-pricing 
       (%) 
       Black FX 
(M2 based prediction) 
Black FX 
Actual 
Date 
7.02 14.47 15.49 Oct-16 
16.26 14.30 16.63 Nov-16 
17.05 14.51 16.98 Dec 16 
19.52 14.64 17.50 Jan-17 
19.31 14.81 17.67 Feb-17 
19.08 15.02 17.89 Mar-17 
20.75 15.24 18.40 Apr-17 
22.29 15.46 18.90 May-17 
23.84 15.67 19.41 Jun-17 
23.89 15.89 19.69 Jul-17 
23.99 16.11 19.98 Aug-17 
23.15 16.34 20.12 Sep-17 
32.17 16.56 21.89 Oct-17 
38.37 16.79 23.23 Nov-17 
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4- Concluding Remarks:  
 
The findings in this research indicate profitability of variable length 
moving avergae trading rule by currency traders when traders practice 
simple trading rule of buying at low price and selling at higher price in 
periods ranging from one day to three weeks . However, such trading rule 
cannot support a positive profit gains when resistence and support trading 
strategies are assumed.  To investigate further trading signals we 
simulated a hypothetical example of three traders who are able to 
coordinate among themselves as oligopolist, under two senarios. The first 
senarion  assume  monetary authority control domestic liquidity so that 
traders cannot increase their balance of domestic currency. In such case it 
is indicated that trading in foreign currency in a black market is not 
sustainable, as the balance of foreign currency declines over time, even 
when traders enjoy  a market power to set prices. However, under the 
second senario it is  assumed that traders have the same fixed amount of 
foreign currency, but they have access to increase domestic currency 
balance, implying that monetary authorities unable to control domestic 
liquidity. In this case trading of foreign currency in the black market 
becomes sustainable, as traders foreign currency  balance increases  
continously over time. These results imply as long as traders in black 
market for foreign exchange have access to increasing domestic currency, 
via gold smuggling, export under-invoicing, or import over-invoicing , 
then black market activities can not  disappear if black market is 
controlled by a few powerful traders who set prices as oligopolist.  
Assuming growth  in domestic liquidity (money supply) is fundamental 
driver of change in black market rate, we estimated the extent of over-
price in the black market rate due to speculative trading of foreign 
exchange. Our results indicate the size of over-price in the black market 
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increased from 7% in October  2016  to  38% in November 2017, 
revealing  expanding market power exerted by the black market traders  
in the last four months of 2017. 
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